Washington International Law Journal
Volume 29

Number 2

4-7-2020

The African Union-ICC Controversy Before the ICJ: A Way Forward
to Strengthen International Criminal Justice?
Sascha-Dominick Dov Bachmann
Naa A. Sowatey-Adjei

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Sascha-Dominick D. Bachmann & Naa A. Sowatey-Adjei, The African Union-ICC Controversy Before the
ICJ: A Way Forward to Strengthen International Criminal Justice?, 29 Wash. Int’l L.J. 247 (2020).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol29/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of
UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

Copyright © 2020 Washington International Law Journal Association

THE AFRICAN UNION-ICC CONTROVERSY BEFORE
THE ICJ: A WAY FORWARD TO STRENGTHEN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE?
Sascha-Dominik Dov Bachmann & Naa A. Sowatey-Adjei†
Abstract: The International Criminal Court was set up as a court of last resort to
prosecute the most serious crimes under international law when its member states are either
unable or unwilling to act. The African Union initially welcomed the court due to the
continent’s history of violence and war. However, their soured when the ICC began
indicting African heads of state and government officials. Since then, there has been a
constant “battle” over whether such defendants could invoke immunity under customary
international law. General criticism of the ICC by the African Union and other observers
for its lack of focus has turned into region-specific criticism of the court as a “Western
tool,” singling out and targeting African leaders. Consequently, African states have started
to refuse to cooperate with the Court. At an AU Summit in January 2018, a resolution was
adopted to seek an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice on the issue
of immunity in respect to the ICC. This article will elaborate on the often-strained AU-ICC
relationship prior to the 2018 AU Summit before examing three scenarios highlighting how
an ICJ decision would affect the present AU-ICC relationship. The article concludes with
recommendations and the observation that a compromise must be sought to end the current
standoff and impasse.
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INTRODUCTION

The International Criminal Court (“ICC”)1 was established as a court
of last resort for the prosecution of serious international crimes, including
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. However, nearly two
decades after its establishment, the Court faces many setbacks; one of its key
challenges being its near exclusive focus on Africa and its leaders.2 This
controversy with the African Union (“AU”) has been going on for nearly a
decade and it never grows boring.3 It has been a challenge to keep track of all
instances in which the African Union has objected to the ICC’s perceived
interference and intrusions in the internal affairs of African countries,
particularly their domestic criminal justice systems.4 During its 2018 ordinary
summit in Addis Ababa, the AU-ICC controversy took a new turn, with the
African Union opting for a more constructive, de-escalatory engagement
using processes of international law and comity.5 The African Union declared
that it would seek through the General Assembly of the United Nations
(“UNGA”) an Advisory Opinion (“AO”) of the International Court of Justice
(“ICJ”)6 on the question of immunity of African heads of state and
governments as a bar to criminal prosecution before the ICC.7 The AU also
sought an interpretative declaration from the ICC’s management oversight and
legislative body, the Assembly of States Parties (“ASP”), on the statutory
relationship between Article 27 of the Rome Statute,8 which removed

1

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter
Rome Statute].
2
Tim Murithi, Africa Relations with the ICC: A Need for Reorientation?, in PERSPECTIVES – POL.
ANALYSIS & COMMENT. FROM AFR., Aug. 6, 2012, at 4.
3
Theresa Reinold, African Union v International Criminal Court: Episode MLXIII(?), EJIL TALK
BLOG OF THE EUR. J. INT’L L. (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/african-union-v-internationalcriminal-court-episode-mlxiii/; see also PHILOMENA APIKO & FATEN AGGAD, EUROPEAN CTR. FOR DEV.
POL’Y MGMT., THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, AFRICA AND THE AFRICAN UNION: WHAT WAY
FORWARD? 1 (2016).
4
Murithi, supra note 2, at 4–6.
5
APIKO & AGGAD, supra note 3, at 1.
6
See Priya Pillai, The African Union, the International Criminal Court, and the International Court
of Justice: At the Fault Lines of International Accountability, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. INSIGHTS (Aug. 22,
2018),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/22/issue/10/african-union-international-criminal-court-andinternational-court.
7
African Union [AU], Decisions, Declarations and Resolution, 30th Ordinary Sess. of the Afr. U
Assembly, at 2 (Jan. 28–9, 2018).
8
Id.
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immunity of state officials accused of core crimes, and Article 98,9 which
addresses cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity of state officials
and consent to surrender state officials. The African Union also sought
clarification on how United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) referrals
affect the immunity of officials of states that are non-signatories to the Rome
Statute.10 This latest move by the African Union may resemble a historic
transition from hitherto politics of hostility to deescalation in its relations to
the Court by resorting to the use of international law11 as a form of proactive
“lawfare.” Lawfare in general refers to the use and the abuse of the rule of law
to achieve political goals as part of a wider strategic approach towards an
adversary; it is often used within the remit of non-contact warfare but can also
be used as a method of its own.12
Before 2018, earlier African Union responses to the ICC have always
centered around the political allegation that the ICC was selectively and
exclusively “prosecuting Africans.”13 The African Union even labelled the
ICC a “neo-colonial court,”14 which seemed to be only interested in
prosecuting Africans opposing Western influence and hence was using Africa
as a “test laboratory” for international criminal justice.15 Consequently, in
2017, the African Union passed a resolution calling on all African States to

9

Id. at 1.
Id.
11
Reinold, supra note 3.
12
Sascha-Dominik Dov Bachmann, Andrew Dowse, & Hakan Gunneriusson, Competition Short of
War – How Russia’s Hybrid and Grey-Zone Warfare are a Blueprint for China’s Global Power Ambitions,
1 AUSTL. J. DEF. & STRATEGIC STUD. 41, 50 (2019). For a more detailed overview of the notion of “Lawfare,”
see Andres B. Munoz Mosquera & Sascha Dov Bachmann, Lawfare in Hybrid Wars: The 21st Century
Warfare, 7 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 63, 63–87 (2016).
13
Sascha Dominik Dov Bachmann & Luke Nwibo Eda, Pull and Push–Implementing the
Complementarity Principle of the Rome Statute of the ICC within the AU: Opportunities and Challenges, 43
BROOKLYN J. INT’L LAW 457, 465 (2018); see also Eki Yemisi Omorogbe, The Crisis of International
Criminal Law in Africa: A Regional Regime in Response? 66 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 287, 287–311 (2019).
14
Omorogbe, supra note 13, at 287–311; Reinold, supra note 3.
15
Africa as a test case in general. See Max Du Plessis & Chris Gevers, Kenyan ICC Cases a Good
Test of an ICC Founding Principle, EJIL TALK BLOG OF THE EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. (Feb. 8, 2011),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/kenyan-case-a-good-test-of-an-icc-founding-principle/. For the overall focus on
Africa, see Bachmann & Eda, supra note 13, at 524; for Africa as a “laboratory,” see Fabrice Tambe Endoh
& ML Melvin Mbao, Political Dynamics in Kenya’s Post-Electoral Violence: Justice Without Peace or
Political Compromise?, 25 AFR. SEC. REV, 275, 280 (2016).
10
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stop cooperating with the ICC in respect to executing warrants for the arrest
of African suspects16 and to withdraw en masse from the ICC.17 South Africa
was one of the first countries to respond to this call for mass withdrawal when
it attempted to leave the ICC in 2017 under the Zuma government. This move,
however, was later blocked by the South African Constitutional Court.18
The consequences of state withdrawals have been discussed in the
relevant literature on international criminal justice.19 The AU argued that the
ICC’s interference in the internal affairs of Africa was scuttling the peace and
reconciliatory efforts in Darfur and Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.20
Consequent to its opposition to the ICC, the African Union took the initial step
to establish a regional criminal court for Africa by adding jurisdictional
powers to the existing African Court of Justice and Human Rights, through
the inclusion of core crimes to its jurisdiction. Such a new hybrid court—part
human rights appeal court and part criminal court—has the potential to reduce
the impact of the ICC on Africa.21 The Protocol on Amendments to the
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (the
“Malabo Protocol”)22 grants immunity from criminal prosecution to African
heads of state—meaning that African leaders accused of core crimes will not

16
Benedict Chigara & Chidebe Nwankwo, “To be or not to be?” The African Union and its Member
States Parties’ Participation as High Contracting States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (1998), 33 NORDIC J. HUM. RTS. 243, 243 (2015).
17
African Union [AU], Decisions, Declarations and Resolution and Motion, 28th Ordinary Sess. of
the Afr. U. Assembly, at 2 (Jan. 30–31, 2017); see also African Union Backs Mass Withdrawal From ICC,
BBC NEWS (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38826073; Gwenyth Gamble Jarvi,
African
Union
Leaders
Back
Leaving
ICC,
JURIST
(Feb.
1,
2017),
https://www.jurist.org/news/2017/02/african-union-leaders-back-leaving-icc/.
18
See South Africa's Decision to Leave ICC Ruled “Invalid,” BBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2017),
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-39050408.
19
Dapo Akande, South African Withdrawal from the International Criminal Court – Does the ICC
Statute Lead to Violations of Other International Obligations?, EJIL TALK BLOG OF THE EURO. J. INT’L L.
(Oct. 22, 2016), https://www.ejiltalk.org/south-african-withdrawal-from-the-international-criminal-court/.
20
Id.;
Bachmann
&
Eda,
supra
note
13,
at
465
(with
further
sources).
21
Max Du Plessis, Implications of the AU Decision to Give the African Court Jurisdiction Over
International Crimes, 235 INST. SECURITY STUD. 1, 8 (2012).
22
See generally AU, Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol of the Statute of the African Court of
Justice and Human Rights, June 27, 2014, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36398-treaty-0045__protocol_on_amendments_to_the_protocol_on_the_statute_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and_human_
rights_e.pdf [hereinafter Malabo Protocol].
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be prosecuted before the proposed new African criminal court while they are
still serving in their official capacities.23 Article 46A bis of the Malabo
Protocol provides that “no charges shall be commenced or continued before
the court against any serving AU Head of State or Government, or anybody
acting or entitled to act in such a capacity, or other senior state officials based
on their functions, during their tenure in office.”24 The general potential for
international criminal justice and also the limitations of such a future PanAfrican Criminal Court have been discussed in literature25 and will be further
scrutinized in this article. Prior to adoption of the Malabo Protocol, the
disagreements between the African Union and ICC had reached new heights
when the African Union accused European states of abusing universal
jurisdiction by issuing arrest warrants against Africans in a bid to strengthen
the hands of the ICC.26 Then, the watershed moment came when the ICC
issued arrest warrants against some African heads of state who were accused
of crimes against humanity.27 The African Union responded by accusing the
ICC of violating the customary law principle of Heads of State Immunity
regarding African leaders.28
Two high profile cases demonstrate this current impasse between the
AU and the Court. The first is the case of now ousted Sudanese President
Omar Al-Bashir,29 and the second is the Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta’s
case.30 The ICC recently confirmed that South Africa was legally required to

23

Id.; Malabo Protocol: Legal and Institutional Implications, Snapshots, AMNESTY INT’L 1, 4 (2017),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR0161372017ENGLISH.PDF.
24
Malabo Protocol art. 46A bis, supra note 22.
25
Eden Matiyas, What Prospects For An African Court Under The Malabo Protocol?,
JUSTICEINFO.NET (May 31, 2018), https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/other/37633-what-prospects-for-anafrican-court-under-the-malabo-protocol.html.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.; Murithi, supra note 2, at 6.
29
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest for violating
Art. 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, 1, 98 (July 14, 2008), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_02856.PDF.
30
See Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, Case Information Sheet, (Mar. 13,
2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CaseInformationSheets/kenyattaEng.pdf; see also ICC drops Uhuru Kenyatta
charges for Kenya ethnic violence, BBC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa30347019.
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arrest Al-Bashir, but it declined to refer South Africa to the UNSC.31
Consequently, on May 8, 2019, the ICC also found that Jordan, as an Arab
League state, breached its treaty obligation under the Rome Statute by failing
to arrest Al-Bashir when he attended an Arab League summit in Amman.32
By and large, the new development in the AU-ICC controversy (without
commenting on the possible outcome/decision of the ICJ on African Union’s
request) will have serious implications for international criminal justice.33
Legal commentators argue that the ICC’s decisions on the questions of
immunity of state officials have been inconsistent,34 and even legally flawed35
(four different, mutually exclusive rationales on immunity), prompting fears
that if the ICJ was to make a finding that contradicts the ICC’s position, ICJ
and ICC may well be on the road to conflicting jurisprudence.36 In addition, it
is also unclear what the reaction of the African Union would be if the ICJ
found in favor of the ICC or vice versa if the ICJ would rule find in favor of
the African Union. Finally, many consider the African Union’s step as capable
of causing a stand-off between the ICC and ICJ despite any future AO of the
ICJ being non-binding in nature.37

31

See Windell Nortje, South Africa’s Refusal to Arrest Omar Al-Bashir, 85 TOAEP POLICY BRIEF
SERIES 1 (2017), http://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/85-nortje/; see also ICC Panel Confirms: South Africa
Legally Required to Arrest Al-Bashir, COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. COURT (July 6, 2017),
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20170706/icc-panel-confirms-south-africa-legally-required-arrestalbashir.
32
ICC Reverses Jordan Non-Cooperation Referral for Failure to Arrest Al-Bashir, INT’L CRIM. J.
RESOURCE CENTRE (May 10, 2019), https://ijrcenter.org/2019/05/10/icc-reverses-jordan-non-cooperationreferral-for-failure-to-arrest-al-bashir/; see also ICC: Jordan Was Required to Arrest Sudan’s Bashir, HUM.
RTS WATCH (Mar 6, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/05/06/icc-jordan-was-required-arrest-sudansbashir.
33
Nabil M. Orina, Should the ICJ Render an Advisory Opinion on the Immunity Question re Articles
27 & 98 of the Rome Statute?, INT. CRIM. JUST. AFRICA (Mar. 24, 2018), https://www.icjafrica.com/singlepost/2018/03/24/Should-the-ICJ-render-an-advisory-opinion-on-the-immunity-question-re-Articles-27-98of-the-Rome-Statute.
34
Id.
35
See Patryk I. Labuda’s “Response” to Reinold’s Article “African Union v International Criminal
Court: Episode MLXIII(?),” EJIL TALK BLOG OF THE EUR. J. OF INT’L L. (March 23, 2018
https://www.ejiltalk.org/african-union-v-international-criminal-court-episode-mlxiii/.
36
Reinold, supra note 3.
37
Orina, supra note 33.
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In light of these pressing issues, this article seeks to understand and
discuss the implications of this new development in the AU-ICC controversy
for the future of international criminal justice. In particular, the impact or
effects it would have on the complementarity jurisdiction and relationship of
the ICC with national legal and judicial authorities. The article will reflect on
the AU-ICC relationship in light of the complementarity provision under
Article 17 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. To that effect it will explore the
relationship between Articles 27 and 98 of the Statute which form the
cornerstone of the African Union’s proposed submission to the ICJ. This leads
then to the question of how the current AU-ICC standoff could be resolved in
light of the potential outcome of a future ICJ ruling. Using three scenarios of
a hypothetical decision by the ICJ, we look into the likely nature and possible
new dimension in the AU-ICC relationship that is likely to develop from the
outcome of the awaited decision of the ICJ on African Union’s request. It will
specifically consider what would be the likely reaction and new approach of
the African Union to the ICC’s policies on prosecution should the ICJ find
against the African Union. It will also consider whether an ICJ decision
finding in favour of the African Union could repair the already battered AUICC relationship. In its third part, the article will consider the potential
implications of a future ICJ decision on the future of international criminal
justice, in particular, the complementarity jurisdiction of the ICC. It will also
consider the potential stand-off that the ICJ decision could cause between the
World Court and the ICC and what impact it would have on the consistency
and predictability of the international criminal justice system. The final part
then looks at the potential effects of such an ICJ AO and their implications for
the future of international criminal justice. The article concludes with some
recommendations and the observation that a compromise has to be sought to
end the current standoff and impasse.
II.

THE AU-ICC RELATIONSHIP BEFORE THE 2018 AU DECISION TO SEEK
AN ICJ ADVISORY OPINION
“In July 2002, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court came into force, giving birth to the International Criminal
Court (‘ICC’ or ‘the Court’). This marked a significant moment
in international criminal justice. The birth of a permanent court
that would hold accountable those responsible for gross
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law

254
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was now a reality. The African region played a great and active
role in the realisation of this Court.”38
The role of African states in the establishment of the ICC in 1988 is
more than often forgotten.39 History has it that African states were very
instrumental in pushing for the realization of the ICC.40 This reflects the fact
that currently out of the one hundred-and-twenty-four member states of the
Court, thirty-three are African, which also represents the largest regional
membership.41 During the period when the Rome Statute—which established
the Court—was adopted, the Organization of African Unity (now African
Union) was reeling from the aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide and the
Arusha peace process in Burundi. These two crucial cases sought to persuade
the African leaders of the essence of complementary justice related to both
national and international bodies as an avenue of strengthening African
jurisprudence.42
A.

Africa’s Contribution to the ICC

African states were extensively involved in the preparations that
preceded the diplomatic conference in Rome, where the Rome Statute of the
ICC was finalized.43 During the preparations, numerous activities that were
related to the formation of the ICC were organized around the African
continent. Other regional blocks later emulated this approach.44 These
activities sought to promote support for the draft text of the Statute, and also
offer more explanation to the various issues raised in the draft. It is estimated
that around ninety organizations (both governmental and non-governmental)

38

Rowland J V Cole, Africa's Relationship with The International Criminal Court: More Political Than
Legal, 14 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 670, 670 (2013).
39
Paul Nantulya, What’s Next for Africa and the International Criminal Court, AFR. CENTER (Dec.
17, 2017), https://africacenter.org/spotlight/whats-next-africa-international-criminal-court-icc/.
40
Daniel D Ntanda Nsereko, Triggering the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 4 AFR.
HUM. RTS. L. J. 256, 257 (2004); see also Hassan Jallow & Fatou Bensouda, International Criminal Law in
an African Context, in AFRICAN GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 41 (Max du Plessis ed., 2008).
41
Nantulya, supra note 39.
42
Id.
43
Phakiso Mochochoko, Africa and the International Criminal Court, in AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 243 (Evelyn A. Ankumah & Edward K. Kawaka eds., 2005).
44
Id. at 247–48
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based in Kenya, South Africa, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Uganda were
part of the coalition that lobbied in their various countries for the immediate
establishment of an International Criminal Court.45 The call for the
establishment of the ICC came from the highest levels of leadership on the
African continent.46 Key among them was the Southern African Development
Community (“SADC”), which was very vocal in its support for the ICC.47
Fourteen member states of the SADC met in September 1997 and set out ten
basic principles which they wanted to be included in the statute of the ICC.48
Later on, a follow up meeting was held in Senegal in February 1998 with
representatives of twenty-five African states attending this meeting. At this
meeting, which produced a resolution generally referred to as the “Dakar
Declaration,” there was a unanimous call for the establishment of an effective
and independent international criminal court, which was approved by all.49
It is worth noting that the support of Africa for the ICC did not end with
these declarations. The African block was also instrumental in crafting the
Rome Statute. Countries like Lesotho, Malawi, Senegal, South Africa, and
Tanzania were involved in the discussions related to the establishment of the
Court at a presentation of a draft statute organized by the International Law
Commission (“ILC”) to the UNGA in 1993.50
African support was further enhanced by the impressive show of
support during the Rome Conference in July 1998, where 47 African countries
were present during the drafting of the Rome Statute and a majority of them

45

Id. at 248.
Cole, supra note 38, at 673.
47
Max du Plessis, The International Criminal Court and Its Work in Africa: Confronting the Myths,
173 ISS PAPER 4, 4 (2008).
48
Khiphusizi Josiah Jele, The Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations, Speech
delivered at the Sixth Committee of the 52nd General Assembly (Oct. 21, 1997).
49
Abdou Diouf, Dakar Declaration for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998,
¶ 4 (Feb. 2, 1988) http://www.iccnow.org/documents/DakarDeclarationFeb98Eng.pdf; African Commission
on Hum. and Peoples’ Rights, Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action, ¶ 1 (April 1999).
50
COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2009);
see also INT’L LAW COMM’N, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION ON THE WORK OF ITS
FOURTH SESSION, 25-6 Doc. A/49/10, (July 22, 1994), http://legal.un.org/ilc/ (accessed July 20, 2019)
[hereinafter Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court].
46
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voted in favor of adoption at the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court.51
After the Statute was open for adoption, Senegal became the first state
party to ratify the Rome Statute on February 2, 1999, and several African
countries followed suit thereafter.52 Côte d’Ivoire in February 2005, when it
was not even a party to the Rome Statute, made a declaration that accepted
the jurisdiction of the ICC in relation to crimes committed on its territory since
September 19, 2002.53 In December 2010, Alassane Ouattara, who was then
involved in a leadership tussle with incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo,
wrote to the ICC in his capacity as the recognized elected President of Côte
d’Ivoire reaffirming the earlier declaration and his state’s full cooperation with
the Court.54 This showed how much the African Union and its member states
appreciated the establishment of the ICC.
Civil Society groups in Africa were also not left behind in this historic
movement. They were very instrumental in building the momentum which led
to the establishment of the ICC.55 The African Commission on Human and
Peoples Rights (“ACHPR”) was one of those groups that was instrumental in
its commitment to the ICC by consistently calling upon African countries to
ratify the Rome Statute and to ensure that they take legislative measures to
make the Statute applicable in the domestic laws of their respective
countries.56 During its 24th Ordinary Session, which was held in October
1998, the ACHPR passed a resolution that urged African countries to ratify
the Rome Statute and to take “legislative and administrative steps to bring

51

Id.
du Plessis, The International Criminal Court and Its Work in Africa, supra note 47, at 5.
53
The declaration was made under Rome Statute art. 12(3), supra note 1, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 99.
54
Letter from Alassane Ouattara, President Côte d'Ivoire, to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC
(Dec. 14, 2010), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/498E8FEB-7A72-4005-A209C14BA374804F/0/ReconCPI.pdf. A further letter was sent to the Court by Ouattara on May 3, 2011,
reconfirming the state's acceptance of its jurisdiction. For the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, see Situations and
Cases – Côte d’Ivoire, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/cdi (last accessed Mar. 9, 2020) (Côte
d'Ivoire eventually ratified the Rome Statute on Feb. 15, 2013).
55
Charles Chernor Jalloh, Regionalizing International Criminal Law?, 9 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 445,
450 (2009).
56
Cole, supra note 38, at 674.
52
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national laws and policies into conformity” with it.57 This was followed by the
adoption of a resolution in 2005 that also called on African countries to
domesticate and implement the Rome Statute.58 Other African NonGovernmental Organizations (“NGOs”) created the Coalition for the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court (the “Coalition”).59 The
Coalition, made up of African NGO’s and their counterparts in the West, had
the aim of encouraging African Governments to ratify the Rome Statute.60
The effort by the African states and civil society groups, as well as
NGOs, during the establishment of the ICC is indicative of the strong and
consistent support for the Court. It demonstrates the need to advance stronger
national laws that deliver justice to victims of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide and possibly put an end to the impunity with which
some African leaders ruled their territories.61
B.

Origins of the AU-ICC Rift

In the aftermath of the horrendous acts committed by the Nazis during
the Holocaust, the world swore that never again would such horrific crimes
be permitted to occur anywhere in the world.62 However, since the Holocaust,
the world has witnessed the commission of further serious human rights
violations and crimes such as crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic

57

African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, Twelfth Annual Activity Report of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights – 1998-1999, 26, OAU Doc. AHG/215(XXXV) (July 1999),
http://www.achpr.org/sessions/24th/resolutions/27/ (Resolution 27 of the 24 Ordinary Session of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: Resolution on the Ratification of the Treaty on the International
Criminal Court).
58
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, Eighth Annual Activity Report of the African
Commission 1994-1995, 42, OAU Doc Ex.CL/236(VIII) (January 2006), http://www.achpr.org/sessions/
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cleansing, and genocide. International Humanitarian Law has been violated in
Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe, especially in the
Balkans,63 highlighting the shift from international to non-international armed
conflict. There have also been unabated violations of human rights in
Myanmar, Sudan, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Libya, and Syria to
cite just some examples. 64 This shows clearly that the world has learnt either
little or nothing from the Holocaust, a failure to act and an omission which the
former UNSG, Kofi Annan, castigated in his famous plea for the
establishment of an International Criminal Court.65 The establishment of the
ICC in 2002 brought hope to many, especially African states, who expressed
optimism that the perpetrators of genocide, various crimes against humanity
and war crimes would finally be held responsible for their crimes.66 Some
countries quickly referred cases to the ICC: Uganda,67 Democratic Republic
of Congo (“DRC”),68 and the Central African Republic.69 These referrals were
relatively uncontroversial and showed the commitment of African states
commitment to the development of human rights as well as combatting
impunity.70
However, this seemingly goodwill relationship between Africa and the
ICC began to turn sour when the ICC turned its focus on Africa’s political
leaders and government officials, who under customary international law were
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considered to possess some form of immunity.71 This impasse between the AU
and the ICC began with the arrest warrant issued by Belgium for the DRC’s
then-minister for foreign affairs, Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, in 2000,
which was not well taken by the African States.72 In 2008, Rose Kabuye, the
Chief of Protocol to Rwandan President Paul Kagame, was arrested in
Germany on a French arrest warrant for the 1994 destruction of the plane
carrying the former president of Rwanda. This crime is thought to have
triggered the Rwandan genocide.73 The charges were dropped in 2009.This
incident was raised at the United Nations by President Kagame who asserted
that the criminal proceedings constituted the exercise of universal jurisdiction
by European states with the sole intention of shaming the political leaders of
Africa.74
The impasse between the two institutions went on to another level with
the referral (for investigation and even prosecution) by the United Nations
Security Council to the ICC, the situation in Darfur, Sudan, under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter and pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute. 75 When
it became obvious that the then-President of Sudan, Omar Hassan Ahmed alBashir,, was to be investigated by the ICC, there was a concerted effort to stay
the investigation by many in Africa and the Middle East because it was
contrary to customary international law.76
Tensions between the African Union and the ICC grew to a higher level
when the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Al-Bashir, despite calls for a stay
of investigations. These calls were made firstly because he was a sitting head
of state and secondly because he belonged to a state not a party to the Rome
Statute.77 The arrest warrant issued by the Court over the Sudanese President
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became the focal point of the African Union’s concerns about its
dissatisfaction with the approach used by both the UNSC and the ICC to tackle
international criminal justice issues in Africa.78
There were two fundamental and related questions that were asked by
legal experts in the wake of the arrest warrant for Al-Bashir: 1) whether
immunities granted as a matter of customary international law to a head of
state may be waived by a treaty (in this case the Rome Statute), and 2) what
was the impact of a referral by the UNSC as it pertains to the relationship
between Articles 27 and 98(1) of the Rome Statute.79
In order to find a solution to the issue at hand, the African Union Peace
and Security Council (“PSC”) then requested that the UNSC utilize its power
provided for in the Rome Statute to defer the ICC process as this was to
compromise any regional peace initiatives.80 This was due to the fact that the
Statute provides that:
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or
proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after
the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to
that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the
same conditions.81
According to the African Union, this stay of investigation was
requested in order not to “undermine the ongoing efforts aimed at facilitating
the early resolution of the conflict in Darfur” as well as alleviate the suffering
caused by the conflict.82 To add to this, there had been earlier efforts at
mediation to help resolve the crisis in Darfur, and there were concerns by
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observers at that time that involving the ICC at that moment would further
derail the efforts to maintain peace.83
The approach taken by the African Union at that time can be described
as a logical approach, bearing in mind that this was the first time the UNSC
was using its power under Article 13 of the Rome Statute to activate the
jurisdiction of the Court to investigate a situation within the territory of a state
that was not party to the Statute.84 Many African leaders spoke up against the
ICC’s alleged persecution of Al-Bashir, which was deemed to be contrary to
the customary international law principle of Head of State immunity as a
manifestation of the principle of sovereign equality under Article 2(4) UN
Charter. This dissent was highlighted in a remark made by the late former
Malawian President Bingu wa Mutharika, then-chairperson of the African
Union, at the July 2010 AU Summit:
To subject a sovereign head of state to a warrant of arrest is
undermining African solidarity and African peace and security
that we fought for so many years . . . there is a general concern
in Africa that the issuance of a warrant of arrest for . . . al-Bashir,
a duly elected president, is a violation of the principles of
sovereignty guaranteed under the United Nations and under the
African Union Charter. Maybe there are other ways of addressing
this problem.85
Notwithstanding, the UNSC failed to grant the deferral request, which
was considered a legal matter and as a result of that, the African Union felt
slighted by the action of the UNSC.86 The growing dissent in Africa was
further compounded by the subsequent referral of Libya by the UNSC to the
Court in 2011. Here again, an African Union’s request for deferral was not
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granted.87 The African Union was ostentiously disappointed with the politics
of referrals and alleged that the UNSC had been selective in its choice of
referring cases which involved African states.88 This was because the same
power of deferral stated in the Rome Statue was used to protect peace keeping
officers in Sudan from prosecution for any breach of international norms as a
result of pressure from the United States.89 The African Union then took a
defiant stance and issued a decision that African states would not cooperate in
the arrest and surrender of Al-Bashir.90
What used to be a troubled relationship with the ICC had by this time
become so toxic that the African Union commenced a non-cooperation policy
towards the ICC. Since then, the Court has been criticized for pursuing a racist
agenda against Africans and possessing an investigative system that is flawed
and that also suffers from undue delays.91 Fatou Bensouda, the current Chief
Prosecutor and an African hailing from the Gambia, has refuted these
allegations, arguing that the African Union is bent on protecting the
perpetrators of these heinous crimes.92 The intensity of the debate surrounding
the impasse between African Union and ICC has worsened over the years and
has negatively impacted the relationship between these two organizations and
has the potential to be detrimental to the international legal order because most
African states, as well as other states, have reservations about the legitimacy
of the ICC’s work and mission.93
Also, this impasse has placed some African states that are signatories
to the ICC in a difficult situation regarding their obligations to both the
African Union and the ICC. States that are party to the Statute are under
obligation to cooperate fully with the ICC in the investigation and prosecution
of crimes that are within the jurisdiction of the Court.94 However, the
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Constitutive Act of the African Union on the other hand warns that sanctions
will be imposed on any member state that does not comply with decisions of
the African Union.95
The anti-ICC stance taken by the African Union has further added to
the disappointment of victims of violent crimes in seeing justice being denied.
The impasse seems to further reinforce public opinion that such egregious
crimes against humanity on the continent are to continue with impunity, a
sentiment which should definitely not be the case.96
C.

Past Unsuccessful Attempts to Resolve the Impasse

For a while, the AU-ICC problem was not considered a priority by the
Court and majority of its State Parties. Even though the Court faced some
backlash due to the indictment of Al-Bashir, the Chief Prosecutor during that
period, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, rebutted the claims. He stated that his position
was to “apply the law without bowing to political consideration.”97 The UNSC
also proved unwilling to address the various concerns brought up by the
African states.98 However, in recent times, the Court (led by its current Chief
Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda) and Assembly of State Parties (“ASP”) have
made efforts to attend to the issues raised by the African states more seriously.
The Office of the Chief Prosecutor (“OTP”) has since called for dialogue
between the two organizations, and this has been supported by a majority of
the State Parties.99 Although Bensouda is still following the strategy of her
predecessor by emphasizing that she cannot take into account political
considerations, she has duly acknowledged the issues of African states and
has utilized her diplomatic leverage to ease the ongoing tensions.100 One of
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the steps taken to amend the friction was the acceptance of the African Union’s
demands during the ASP annual meeting in 2013. Here, the rules of the Court’s
regarding the presence at trial for accused who occupy positions at the highest
national level was amended.101 This amendment was made to help reduce the
amount of time that Kenya’s President Kenyatta and his deputy, Ruto, would
have to spend at the Hague during the proceedings of their indictmentbefore
the charges were withdrawn in 2014 and 2016 respectively.102
The amendment of rules regarding the presence of high ranking state
officials as well as the withdrawal of the charges were welcomed by the
African Union Assembly, but the Assembly still expressed dissatisfaction that
the Council had not acted on the issues of deferrals.103 To ensure that future
requests for deferrals were not ignored by the UNSC, and to prevent other
heads of states from being indicted, the African Union Assembly called for
several amendments to the Rome Statute. Most crucially, it demanded that the
UNGA be given the power to defer the proceedings of the Court and mandated
that Heads of State be granted immunity from prosecution during their time
in office.104 The Assembly further made moves to fast track the establishment
of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African
Court”). It is the African Union’s aim that this Court will in future possess
jurisdiction over the four main international crimes being tried by the ICC and
potentially function as a regional alternative to the ICC as well.105 The
Amendment Protocol of this Court, which was adopted by the African Union
Assembly in 2014, further provides immunity for sitting heads of state.106 The
subsequent withdrawal of charges by the ICC against Kenyatta in 2014 based
on allegations of lack of cooperation from the Kenyan government by the
Chief Prosecutor was also welcomed by the African Union and the tensions
between the two organizations seemed to have lessened to an extent. However,
the issue of immunity of heads of states has since not been settled and the
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allegation that the ICC still has its focus only on Africa while several crimes
against humanity continue to occur around the world is still considered true
by many.107
D.

Why did the African Union opt for a New Approach?

The African Union, at its 30th summit in 2018, finally decided to make
a request to the UNGA to seek an AO from the ICJ.108 This was, however, not
the first time the ICJ discussed seeking an AO from the Court. In 2012, the
African Union Assembly requested the African Union commission to consider
seeking an AO from the ICJ, which was eventually not followed up.109 Kenya,
on behalf of the African Union, subsequently made a formal request included
in the provisional agenda of the 73 UNGA meeting held in September 2018,
under the heading “Request for an AO of the International Court of Justice on
the consequences of legal obligations of States under different sources of
international law with respect to immunities of Heads of State and
Government and other senior officials.”110
This is relevant because legal experts have welcomed the move by the
African Union to seek an AO from the ICJ that they consider useful for
political reasons. This is because there is currently so much distrust on this
issue between the African Union and the ICC and it very unlikely that African
states would accept a decision of the ICC on this matter.111 Also, the decisions
made by the ICC on the issue of immunity and the noncooperation of certain
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states regarding the arrest warrant of Al-Bashir have so far been criticised as
inconsistent and unpredictable by legal experts.112 In its ruling on Malawi and
Chad in 2011, the Court held that customary international law gives no
exception for heads-of-state immunity in relation to international courts’
jurisdiction.113 In a follow up decision in 2014 on the DRC, the Court held
that UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005) implicitly waives the immunities enjoyed
by the Sudanese President.114 On the other hand, in its decision on South
Africa and Jordan (2017), the Court’s majority determined that Sudan (as a
non-state party) had rights and duties parallel to a state party by virtue of
Resolution 1593 and that Article 98(1) would not apply. Even though the
conclusions of all the decisions was that Al-Bashir was not immune from
arrest and thus states failed in their duty to arrest him, many do not agree with
the legal reasoning by the Pre-Trial Chamber as each ruling came to the same
conclusion with divergent and (even) incompatible legal arguments.115 These
“conflicting” determinations to the same issue do not augur well for
jurisprudence, and hence an opinion by the ICJ would probably put the matter
to rest.116
The legal issue of whether state obligations to the ICC—such as
extradition–overrule conflicting customary international law, which may offer
immunity to incumbent Heads of State and other key cabinet ministers
remains contentious117 Another issue of concern is that, while the Judges of
the Court have the ability to determine relevant state obligations to the ICC,
it is not clear as to whether they are competent enough to ascertain whether a
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state has relevant competing or conflicting responsibilities to other
international bodies, such as the African Union.118
These views and concerns were well highlighted in the request Kenya
made on behalf of the African Union to the United Nation General
Assembly,which sums up the potential benefits to the future ICC-AU
cooperation in general and the provision of a lasting resolution to the longdisputed issue of immunities and the conflicting obligations of States under
international law. The relevance of the points raised by the AU request and its
intended benefits are noteworthy and are provided below in full:
(a) “Members of the United Nations will benefit from a General
Assembly request for an AO of the International Court of Justice that
will provide clarity to the evident ambiguity and to competing
obligations under international law and will assist States in carrying out
their obligations without undermining either the call for ending
impunity or the legal regime governing the immunities of Heads of
State and Government and other senior officials.”119
(b) “By having recourse to the International Court of Justice, as the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations, the General Assembly
would3 also underscore its resolve to give effect to the mission
entrusted to it by the Members of the United Nations to ensure the
appropriate implementation of international legal norms within the
work of the United Nations and its Member States.”120
(c) “the divergence of States’ practices and relying on their own
interpretation rather than recourse to available international justice
mechanisms thereby undermine the international justice system and the
legal regime governing relations between States in its entirety.”121
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Another argument that has been put across in favor and support of the
request for an AO is that the ICJ is in a better position to address all the
international law issues put up by the African Union as well as other issues
proceeding from the Rome Statute. These arguments are bolstered by the fact
that the ICJ has previously handled similar questions related to the state of
immunity under customary international law and also the status of Resolutions
from the Security Council.122 Thus, the ICJ, a court that has no links to the
Rome Statute and is the primary international tribunal on issues of general
international law, is seen by many as the solution to making inroads on this
contentious matter.123
On July 9, 2018, Kenya, acting on behalf of the AU Group in New York,
made the request to the UN General Assembly to have the African Union’s
decision to approach the ICJ included in the provisional agenda of the 73rd
Session of the UNGA.124 The request was granted and the African Union’s
request subsequently included in the provisional agenda number A/73/144.125
It is worthy to note that the procedure of obtaining an AO from the ICJ will
be an extensive one. First and foremost, the African group at the United
Nations must lobby to gain a majority vote within the UNGA, and then the
ICJ will have the prerogative whether to offer its opinion or otherwise.126
However, the ICJ has never refused to give its (advisory) opinion on any case
as long as its jurisdiction applies, like its predecessor, the Permanent Court of
International Justice (“PCIJ”), and this case may not be an exception.127
It can only be hoped that the aim of this call for an AO by the ICJ was
not driven by the motivation to placate opportunistic states that have become
disgruntled with the Court. Instead the sole motivation should be to find a way
for the ICC, which depends solely on the cooperation of States to deliver on
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its mandate of ending impunity for crimes against humanity, war crimes,
genocide and aggression.128
III.

ASSESSING THE LIKELY NATURE OF THE AU-ICJ RELATIONSHIP AFTER
AN ICJ DECISION

We will now discuss the likely implications that may arise in the light
of a (potential) ruling either against or in favor of the African Union as well
as the potential impact of the ICJ decision on pending cases involving
Africans before the ICC. Also, the potential for the AU and the ICC to utilize
such a ruling to foster a new consensus will be touched upon.
A.

The ICJ Finds Against the African Union

There have been various opinions about the likely outcome of the ICJ
ruling and what its impact would be on the current relationship between the
two bodies. Some legal scholars suspect that the ICJ’s final decision may not
favor the African Union.129 Even though the request of the African Union for
an AO follows the above mentioned institutional due processes of both the
AU and potentially the UN GA, it still carries the potential of a diplomatic
confrontation. Requesting the ICJ to provide an AO on the issue of issue of
immunities and the conflicting obligations of States has been described as
similar to appealing against the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision directly to
the ICJ instead of approaching the Appeals Chamber of the ICC. Such a step
would be tantamount to judicial confrontation.130
In support of such predictions of an unfavorable outcome is the fact
that, while the African Union disagrees with the ICC on this issue of head-ofstate immunity, there are African courts that have issued rulings on this issue
that lean in favor of the ICC’s position.131 For instance, the Kenyan Court of
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Appeal on February 6, 2018 held that “as a matter of general customary
international law it is no longer in doubt that a Head of State will personally
be liable if there is sufficient evidence that he authorized or perpetrated those
internationally recognized serious crimes.”132 Hence the Kenyan Government
acted with impunity when it failed to arrest Al-Bashir in 2010, thus breaching
Kenyan domestic law, its constitution, and international treaties like the Rome
Statute.133 The Kenyan judgement resonates with the one from the South
African Supreme Court of Appeal, which ruled unanimously that the South
African government’s refusal to arrest Al-Bashir was inconsistent with its
obligations to the Rome Statute, as well as Section 10 of the ICC Act. 134
Therefore, while many view the request to the ICJ as a promising move for
political reasons, the legal decisions from national courts with authority in
Africa does not augur well for the African Union’s chances to secure a
promising outcome at the ICJ.135
Correspondingly, others have posited that the Rome Statute does not
provide the means by which the ICJ can be asked to provide an AO on an issue
that the ICC is currently adressing. Furthermore, while the UNGA has the
authority to make such a request, this move would be equivalent to
sidestepping the authority of the ICC. Such a move would effectively allow
the African Union to engage in a form of “forum shopping,” which may cause
new tensions to arise between the ICJ and ICC.136 Another perspective is that
the request for an AO is an attempt of the African Union to control the ICC,
and this would be equivalent to sidelining the Court to indulge another forum
for adjudication.137 Another issue under discussion is that the ICC is under no
obligation to accede to the reasoning of the ICJ should it decide in favour of
the AU. This potential backing of the ICC by the ICJ had been predicted by
legal scholars as a move to avoid clashes between the two Courts, which
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would eventually be an unhealthy reflection on their legacies in the event that
they both adopt opposing legal positions on the same issue.138
1.

The African Union could return to Its Plan to Establish a Regional
Criminal Court

As mentioned above, an unfavorable ruling for the African Union may
serve as a catalyst for the establishment of an African regional criminal court.
The quest for establishing a regional court to try crimes of international nature
by the African Union began in the 1970s during the discussion on the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.139 Many commentators have,
however, alluded to the fact that the Africa’s quest for establishing a regional
criminal court of its own was motivated politically and commenced as an
import of the crises between the African Union and the ICC over the arrest
warrant for Al-Bashir.140 Even though it cannot be denied that the Al-Bashir
case has intensified the desire of Africa to prosecute international crimes on
its own, it may be misleading to say that this case is the underpinning of the
African quest for jurisdiction over international crimes committed against
humanity.141 Notwithstanding, the calls for a regional criminal court have
intensified since 2009.142 Earlier in 2006, ideas started coming up for the court
when The Summit of the African Union Heads of State and Governments met
in Khartoum, Sudan, and agreed to set up a Committee of Eminent African
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Jurists on the Case of Hissène Habré (the “Committee”).143 The Committee
observed that “there is room in the Rome Statute for such a development and
that it would not be a duplication of the work of the International Criminal
Court.”144 In the Committee’s opinion Articles 1 and 17 of the Rome Statute
focus on the issue of complementarity of the jurisdictions of national courts
and does not recognise regional jurisdictions. This position did not prevent the
establishment of such regional courts in co-existence with the ICC because
such a regional court may not be answerable to the ICC.145
2.

The Need for Establishing An African Regional Criminal Court

According to an expert on International Law and Organizations,
Professor Ademola Abass, there are three central reasons that support the
establishment of an African regional criminal court to prosecute crimes of
international nature in tangent with the ICC.
Firstly, and as mentioned earlier, the desire to create this court was
expressed in the 1970s with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights. However, the committee responsible for the Charter did not agree to
the proposal to embrace a court as part of the Charter with international
criminal jurisdiction in its provisions.146 It argued that it was premature to
establish such a court since the International Convention on the Suppression
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid had already made a provision for
“an international penal court”147 and the United Nations at that time was
considering establishing “an international court to repress crime against
mankind.”148 The proposal was therefore motivated by the crime of
“Apartheid” in South Africa, which had then been regarded by the UNGA as
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a crime against humanity149 as early as 1966 and informed the debate in the
1970s. This view regarding the nature of which was also reaffirmed by the
UNSC in 1984.150 Apartheid existed in South Africa from 1948 until 1993,
and even though it was recognized as an international crime, there was no
internationally established court to prosecute the crime. A prosecution of the
crime before any competent domestic or international tribunal never
materialized.151 Hence, States were left on their own to pass legislation that
would enable them to prosecute the crime of apartheid and to try criminals of
apartheid on the basis of a form of universal jurisdiction. South Africa’s
system of racial segregation and discrimination, Apartheid, had a huge impact
on the lives of South Africans as well as the African Continent. The failure to
prosecute the crime of Apartheid during its “lifetime” in South Africa
highlights the often-difficult reality of achieving criminal justice in Africa –
not least due to political and other reasons. The crime of Apartheid can now
be prosecuted as a crime against humanity under Article 7 (1) (j) of the Rome
Statute.152 Thus, the need to create Africa’s own criminal court was further
heightened at that time, and according to some commentators, that need still
pertains today.153 Interesting in this context and highlighting the above
political dynamics of bringing international justice to Africa is the observation
that the new post Apartheid South Africa hasn’t signed up to the Apartheid
Convention post 1994 (despite the relevance of this UN Convention and its
universal scope of application), leaving the ICC the only available avenue for
any judicial redress.154
Secondly, the Constitutive Act (“AU Act”) of the African Union as well
as other treaties provide the necessary legal basis to prosecute crimes of
international nature.155 The AU Act provides for “the right of the Union to
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intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect
of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and
stability to the Member State of the Union upon the recommendation of the
Peace and Security Council.”156 These crimes (apart from the “threat to
legitimate order”) are in tangent with the international crimes over which the
ICC has jurisdiction. It is therefore necessary for the African Union to take
the necessary steps to address these violations stipulated in the AU Act. This
is because in the instance where there had been no established international
criminal tribunal like the ICC to prosecute these crimes, the obligation to
prosecute these crimes would definitely fall on the African Union. One may
argue that national courts have the jurisdiction to prosecute such cases but
sadly these crimes are committed by people who hold political power, and
efficient prosecution of such crimes has always presented a difficulty in Africa
where political manipulation of the judiciary is rife.
In addition, other African states would not be willing to prosecute their
fellow high-profile defendants on the basis of the much-criticized principle of
universal jurisdiction, hence the need for the African Union to provide a
system to deal with such issues.157 Reference can be made to the case of
Hissène Habré, the former president of Chad. An arrest warrant was issued for
Habré by Belgium while he was seeking asylum in Senegal. Senegal declined
to deport the accused to Belgium and with the advice of the African Union
decided instead to prosecute the culprit.158 Senegal also refused to give Habré
back to Chad for prosecution even though both countries possessed the
jurisdiction to do so, claiming head of state immunity which most African
states subscribe to.159 The decision of the African Union to allow Senegal to
prosecute Habré was the only probable option because The Committee of
Eminent African Jurists,160 established by the African Union to specifically
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provide advice on all implications of the Habré case, reported that none of the
two African courts possessed the powers to prosecute the accused.161 The
Committee thus made a recommendation that would apply to future cases
when stating that: “. . . the possibility of conferring criminal jurisdiction on
the African Court of Justice [to confer criminal competence that can be
adopted by states within a reasonable time-frame] to make the respect for
human rights at national, regional and continental levels a fundamental tenet
of African governance.”162
In essence, Habré’s case reveals that neither the courts of Africa, which were
set up to deal with such criminals—especially those found in power— nor the
courts of other African states have the credibility to deliver justice when faced
with such circumstances. Thus, there is the need to adhere to Committee
recommendation to establish a regional court that can successfully prosecute
such crimes.
Thirdly and lastly, it is worth noting that, apart from the general
obligation that the AU Act and other treaties imposes on the African Union,
there are other crimes that the African Union is obliged to prosecute that are
peculiar to Africa and where the ICC has no jurisdiction. The fact that these
crimes are not included in the Rome Statute are implications of the fact that
the ASP does not find these crimes to be “serious” enough to come under the
jurisdiction of the ICC, but they do occur in Africa all the time to the detriment
of its development. One of these crimes included in this section is the so called
Unconstitutional Change of Governments (“UCGs”) criminal offence, coup
respectively, and its associated problems that have plagued most African
countries to date, such as Zimbabwe, Libya, Burkina Faso, and Burundi being
the most recently affected.163
The extensive damage caused by these UCGs to the peace and stability
of African countries caused the African Union to adopt the African Charter on
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Democracy, Election, and Governance (“ACDEG”) in 2003.164 The Charter,
which came into force in 2012, outlaws and criminalizes all acts which
constitute UCGs165. This would ensure that there is a reduction in the spate of
armed conflicts as well as a better observance of the rule of law.166 The Rome
Statute allows for the prosecution of the so called “core crimes” as “the most
serious crimes of international concern”167 which are often committed with a
nexus to an armed conflict but also in non conflict circumstances like the
present persecution of ethnic Uighurs by China as a potential crime against
humanity in terms of the Rome Statute168. The ICC as a criminal court is first
of all a judicial body that responds to crimes which have been committed with
the futher ultimate goal of creating prevention through an element of
deterrence for any future perpetrator of such crimes. By proscribing UCGs,
the African Union has added to this preventive aim by ensuring that acts
within the remit of UCGs precipitate crimes that the ICC has jurisdiction
over.169 It is, however, crucial that for the African Union to proscribe a crime
such as UCG, which is not recognized universally as an international crime,
its status under international law must first be taken into consideration.170 The
handling of UCGs is one of the few norms that can be described to have
gradually evolved through custom and finally ending up in the categorization
of the ACDEG. In the early days when UCGs were rampant on the African
continent, there were several declarations made to condemn the act until its
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status was finally confirmed by the entry into force of the treaty in 2012.171
UCGs have reduced over the last couple of years but there must come a time
that they would be a thing of the past in order to aid the development of the
African Agenda of maintaining peace and the rule of law at all times.
The foregoing sections have thus discussed the need to establish an
African regional criminal court which would enable Africa to better handle its
affairs without facing further “prejudice” as is currently alleged to be
happening at the ICC. The move to establish this Court has been a long
winding journey, however, it is the hope of many that it will finally come to
fruition in the future.
3.

The Threats of Mass African Withdrawal from the ICC may become a
reality

It has also been speculated by legal commentators that a ruling against
the African Union would finally lead to mass African exodus from the ICC.172
There have already been threats of such a move in the past following reports
by the media in 2017 that the African Union had adopted a plan for mass
withdrawal from the ICC.173 Earlier on in 2016, three countries, Burundi,
South Africa, and Gambia, put in applications to the UN Secretary General of
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their intentions to leave the ICC. South Africa and Gambia later withdrew
their applications, but Burundi went ahead and became the first state to
withdraw from the ICC.174 The possibility of a collective withdrawal, which
has been in the works for some time, symbolizes the high-water mark of
African Union opposition to the ICC.175
One of the underlying issues that has fueled the move for a mass
withdrawal is the UNSC. At the time of writing, three out of the five members
of the Security Council (United States of America, Russia, and China) are not
party to the Rome Statute due to their own particular reasons. However, the
Rome Statute gives the UNSC powers to refer cases to the ICC176 in the
absence of referrals by State Parties or in cases where the crime has been
committed outside the jurisdiction of the Court.177 It is truly hypocritical and
highlights the outdated nature of our post-1945 UN system that the states of
Russia, US and China, which continue to refuse to be held accountable by the
Rome Statute, are in a position to referee cases to the Court through their role
as UNSC permanent members.178 Even more troubling is the fact that the
Security Council has not always been consistent in referring war crimes. On
several occasions, the United States vetoed resolutions of the UNSC regarding
war crimes committed by Israel on the territory of Palestine. Also, China and
Russia have vetoed UN draft resolutions to refer the case of Syria and the
Rohingya people in Myanmar to the ICC, despite the fact that African
countries have consistently called for the UNSC to refer these cases.179
This brings to the fore the question of whether Africa should continue
to engage with the Court when it has no veto power to make decisions on
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issues, especially those pertaining to African countries.180 Another example of
selective referrals is the United Kingdom’s alliance with the United States to
go to war with Iraq. The then UN Secretary General, the late Kofi Annan,
explicitly stated that the war on Iraq breached the UN Charter and was
therefore illegal.181 A criminal prosecution of either former British Prime
Minister Tony Blair or his senior military officers before the ICC for the crime
of aggression was impossible, as this crime only came into existence in
2017.182 While the Iraqi campaign of 2003 clearly lacked legality, a
prosecution under the Rome Statute was not possible, as this would have
amounted to a violation of the Court’s non-retroactivity principle.183 Given the
illegality and therefore immorality of the Iraq war and the apparent impunity
for the decision makers at that time, it was only a question of time until African
leaders, politicians and academics would point to this example of Western
hypocrisis. Questions could be asked whether the Western powers that engage
in such crimes were above the law. Some critics went even so far to view this
as an example of the Court’s use of selective justice and enforcement of the
law in a rather “tyrannical” fashion.184 Understandable as such criticism might
be, it lacks the legal basis as stated above, but Western denial and lack of
legitimacy regarding the justification for the war in Iraq continues to tarnish
the ICC’s overall legitimacy and future potential.
Also often forgotten in this debate are the actual victims of these crimes.
These victims have no access to justice and the tensions between the African
Union and the ICC have incapacitated the African Union by making it lose
focus, which has frustrated the efforts to make the necessary reparations to the
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victims. Hence, it has been suggested that severing ties with the ICC could
possibly give the African Union to chance to organize its internal affairs
appropriately thereby bringing justice and peace to the victims.185
However and despite the seeming justified stance of the African Union,
the threats of a mass withdrawal due to these challenges would not augur well
for both the African Union and the ICC and various legal experts have asserted
that such a move would definitely be the “death” of the ICC and in
international criminal justice.186 This would also be detrimental to
international criminal law because to some it is "better to have an imperfect
court than none at all. It's like saying because we don't catch all the criminals,
we shouldn't hold trials."187 Former ICC Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno
Ocampo, has also described the move as a dangerous one and described the
action of the African Leaders as “hypocritical.”188 His comments remind one
of the overall strong support the ICC initially enjoyed in Africa. One should
also bear in mind that there have been cases of “trade offs” between the Court
and post conflict governments with sometimes dubious human rights records
themselves during the initial years of the Court’s existence. This immunity in
exchange for collaboration could indeed be seen as hypocritical.189 He warned
that victims of these atrocities would continue to suffer under the leadership
of those who perpetrate these crimes if they are not held accountable for their
actions.190 It is therefore expedient for the ICC and the African Union to find
middle grounds on this issue of immunity of heads of states thereby anchoring
justice firmly to the process of long-term global peace.
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If the ICJ Finds in Favor of the African Union

What would happen if the opposite came true and the ICJ was to find
in favor of the African Union? Some legal experts have posited that such a
finding would be beneficial to the wider international legal discourse as
such.191 At least, it would serve as a vindication of the political opposition of
the African Union to the ICC. As stated supra, a favorable ruling may support
the legal reasoning of the African Union and hopefully put to rest all the issues
surrounding immunities of heads of states under international law. It would
also mean that such an ICJ ruling would be in tangent with the African Union
argument whereas heads of states are immune from prosecution by either the
ICC or national authorities seeking to cooperate with the ICC.192 In the case
of immunity from prosecution by the ICC, the African Union has always
argued that customary international law grants immunity from the jurisdiction
of international tribunals. In the case of immunity before national courts, the
African Union has made three assertions over the years: firstly, asserting that
there exists such immunity for head of states (and other governmental heads)
under customary law; secondly, previous Afrocan Union treaties and decisions
(like the OAU General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
OAU) grant immunities to heads of states; and finally, these immunities are
spelt out in Art 98 of the Rome Statute and therefore should take effect at all
times when the need arises.193 Thus African States were, and are still, under
no obligation to arrest Al-Bashir, and the Pre Trial Chamber failed to take Art
98 into consideration when it issued the arrest warrants for Al-Bashir in 2009
and 2010.194 A ruling in favor of the African Union would potentially highlight
the fact that the issues raised by the African Union over the years have been
legally right would probably set a precedent that would guide future legal
discourse.
There have been legal opinions that a ruling in favor of the African
Union would vindicate the political stance of the African Union questioning
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the legitimacy of the ICC. Over the years, the practices utilized by the ICC
have caused legal experts to question the legitimacy of the Court.195 The ICC
has to be seen as an institution wrenched between the demands of legalism,
legitimacy respectively, and the demands arising out of the broader political
and diplomatic context of the environments in which it operates.196 It is yet to
strike a balance between the two conflicting demands which is threatening its
survival.197 The ICC’s legitimacy has also been questioned over the past years
due to its inability to dutifully construct the rules and apply them in strict
compliance as stipulated in the Rome Statute. Indeed, the practices employed
by the Court have departed from the text of the law on many occasions and
this has caused various party states and observers to further question the
Court’s method of interpreting the law.198
In the Pre Trial Chamber decisions made on the arrest of Al-Bashir in
ICC states the Court arrived at the same conclusion while using varied and
conflicting legal arguments with which many legal experts have since
disagreed.199 This has further fueled the assertion that the Court is more
political than legal.200 For instance, the Court buckled under political pressure
from the United States when the Chief Prosecutor attempted to investigate
potential war crimes by US soldiers in Afghanistan.201 The United States
issued various threats and stated that it would impose restrictions on any ICC
staff who investigated US or allied personnel. These counter measures did,
however, constitute an improvement from a 2002 announcement by the Bush
Administration that it would even use military force to “free” U.S. Service
Members detained by or on behalf of the Court under U.S. legislation that
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became infamously known as the “Hague Invasion Act.”202 It followed its
threats by revoking the Chief Prosecutor’s U.S. visa in April, 2019.203 The
ICC quickly relented, and the Panel of Judges announced a few weeks later
that it had rejected the Chief Prosecutor’s request would no longer pursue the
case of Afghanistan.204
These acts giving political preference to powerful nations demonstrates
how the Court has become a tool for Western domination to the detriment of
lesser states. Another example of political dominance is the Kenyan case.
President Kenyatta and his deputy, Ruto, made a statement that they would
only cooperate with the Court if their trials are conducted on alternative
days.205 The Trial Chamber thus reversed its stance on the issue206 without
resorting to any form of clarification, which caused many to ask whether the
judges or the accused were in charge of the case. Following the lack of
cooperation from the Kenyan Government in producing evidence, the Chief
Prosecutor was forced to abandon the case in the long run.207 This case also
questions the legitimacy of the Court when it bases its decisions on statements
made by political leaders who stand accused. Moving forward, there is the
need for the ICC as an institution to gain back its legitimacy by impartially
identifying and applying its legal rules objectively devoid of any political
considerations and pressures.
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A Ruling as a Potential Draw and Compromise

Apart from the two alternatives favoring one of the two parties to the
dispute, there is further possibility that the ICJ’s AO would not declare one
institution victorious over the other but recommend a conciliatory
compromise. Both the African Union and the ICC have posited various legal
arguments to support their stance on the issue of immunity. Thus, the ICJ may
try to find a middle ground where both parties can reach a consensus in order
to forge ahead with the quest of dealing with perpetrators that are involved in
war crimes which is very important to both parties. It is the view of some legal
commentators that a) the ICJ will exercise its discretion in a manner that
would ensure uniformity of the law by taking into consideration the legal
arguments from both organizations and b) will make its decision from the
perspective of customary international law.208 In effect, the relationship
between Articles 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute would be clarified in a manner
that would avert further controversy.209
1.

Reduction of Future Tensions Between the ICC and Other National
Jurisdictions Beyond Africa

Due to (mostly unfounded) allegations of bias and lack of effectiveness
against the ICC, states which have not ratified the Rome Statute seem to be in
no hurry to do so. Far from becoming a World Court with global reach as some
feared, the ICC’s deficiencies in terms of its jurisdiction, the conduct of
preliminary investigations, and its overall inability to shake off the
perceptions of constituting “selective justice” have already impacted
negatively on its overall legitimacy around the world.210 The AO by the ICJ
would therefore provide much need clarification and generally set a (nonbinding) “precedent,” which could be referred to in other jurisdictions beyond
Africa in the future. Whatever the outcome is, there should be a guiding
principle on head-of-state immunity under international law and specifically
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for heads of states that are not party to various treaties regardinginternational
criminal justice. This would generally put to rest the legal tussle between the
two organizations. Also, the tensions between the African Union and the ICC
would be averted in similar future cases beyond Africa. Likewise, other states
may be encouraged to engage with the ICC without fearing the loss of
sovereignty.
2.

The Impact of the ICJ Decision on Pending Cases From Africa Before
the ICC

It has been argued in some quarters that the request of the African Union
is not an attempt to either defy the ICC or undermine its credibility but should
rather be seen as a product of negotiated engagement with the Court.211 Thus
the AO from the ICJ would present an improved ICC that would be established
on solid legal grounding.212
From the discussions in the previous sections, there is the likelihood
that the ICJ may agree with the ICC’s position on immunity of heads of states
and other leaders of government. However, there are also views that there
would be more clarity on the issue from the AO that would settle matters,
which would also help the ICC work within a better framework that is more
acceptable to all parties to the Statute than before.213
Questions have since been asked as to what happens to cases that are
still pending before the Court if, per chance, the African Union does not agree
with the AO and decides to carry out its agenda of a mass withdrawal.214
According to South African law professors Chenwi and Sucker, it could
happen that some accused persons may escape ICC prosecution.215 However,
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according to Article 127(2) of the Rome Statute, prosecution is still possible
for cases that were ongoing at the time of withdrawal and also future cases
that relate to alleged crimes committed while the state concerned was still a
party to the Statute.216 Therefore, a withdrawal would definitely not affect the
exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC as the duty to cooperate with the Court
would continue.217 Taking the case of Burundi, which finalized its withdrawal
on October 27, 2017, the ICC confirmed that its investigation into “[a]lleged
crimes against humanity committed in Burundi or by nationals of Burundi
outside Burundi since 26 April 2015 until 26 October 2017 had not been
affected and were currently ongoing despite the withdrawal becoming
effective.”218 To add to this, there still lies the possibility of referrals of such
cases from the UNSC by states not party to the Rome Statute, but who have
United Nation membership, which would result in prosecutions subject to the
principle of complementarity.219
Therefore, current cases pending before the ICC, whether from party
states or non-party states, would still continue despite what the outcome of the
AO would be with a renewed strength to hold accountable all who are
involved in war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
3.

Repairing the Damaged Relationship between the African Union and
ICC

All hope is not yet lost in this current deadlock between the African
Union and the ICC. It has been suggested that if the ICC pays more attention
to the issues raised by the African Union, it would lead to the restoration of
the relationship that has been marred allegations of selective justice.220 This
could be done through more constructive dialogue involving more of the ICC
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supporting voices within the African Union221 and a focus on the need to take
“African” concerns more seriously when assessing the ICC-AU relationship.
Various attempts have been made in the past but have yielded no results.222
Therefore, there should be a conscientious effort on the part of both
institutions to ensure that outcomes of these meetings are enforced efficiently
and effectively.223
Also, both the African Union and the ICC should make an effort to shift
grounds on the issue of criminal justice delivery. Thus, the two organizations
must seek to revamp their approaches to international criminal justice and
move from past contentious issues of interorganizational confrontation to
peace and justice building of today and the future. The complementarity
regime that the ICC was established upon must be implemented by both
parties. This would involve the strengthening of national courts to effectively
take jurisdiction over war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.224
This would ensure that the perpetrators of these crimes are held totally
accountable thereby hopefully removing the root causes of conflict in
Africa.225
A future AO from the ICJ may have various implications whether it
rules in the favor of the African Union or not. Whatever the outcome might
be, it is the hope of many that both parties would take notice of various
recommendations that would be made and work hand in hand to make the rule
of law achievable on the African Continent and the world at large.
4.

Utilizing the ICJ Ruling to Foster a New AU-ICC Consensus

The different perspectives on the issues stemming from this case
demonstrate that “the importance of getting the immunity question right
cannot be overstated,” since “[i]t implicates not just the first trial of a head of
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state by the ICC, but the relationship between African states and the ICC more
broadly.”226
The outcome of the ICJ ruling should aim at fostering a new consensus
for the African Union and the ICC. The African states and the African Union
have expressed commitment to pursuing accountability for such crimes, as
shown in earlier sections, their overwhelming support for the creation of the
ICC, and currently holding the largest regional representation. Although the
ICC is currently faced with a lot of challenges, it still remains a tool for justice
and a solution in a continent where the quest for justice can be described as
“searching for a needle in a hay stack.”227 Despite the numerous reservations
that the African Union and African observers have expressed about the Court
and its seeming lack of credibility, there are still many that have the view that
future generations would support the ICC as a complementary global legal
organization.228 This is because there would never come a time that the legal
solutions to conflicts in Africa would be sufficient but surely “there can be no
solution without justice.”229 The upcoming ICJ ruling should therefore bring
both institutions to a renewed point where seeking and delivering justice
should be the key focus at all times without political interference. As at the
time of writing and for the interim, it is clear that the ICC would remain the
only institution that has jurisdiction over the crimes that are committed with
impunity in Africa. The cooperation of the African Union is therefore needed
to ensure that the judgement of reason always outweighs that of power.230 This
is further emphasized by Justice Robert H. Jackson’s statement at the
commencement of the Nuremberg trials;
“That four generations flushed with victory and stung with injury
stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive

226

Christopher Gevers, The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber's Non-Cooperation Decision on Malawi, WAR
LAW (Feb. 16, 2012), http://warandlaw.blogspot.com/2012/02/icc-pre-trial-chambers-noncooperation.html.
227
du Plessis, The International Criminal Court and Its Work in Africa, supra note 47, at 2.
228
Bachmann & Eda, supra note 13, at 533.
229
Mehari Taddele Maru, The International Criminal Court and African Leaders: Deterrence and
Generational Shift of Attitude, 124 ISPI ANALYSIS PAPER 1, 8 (2014).
230
Bachman & Eda, supra note 13, at 534.
AND

APRIL 2020

AFRICAN UNION-ICC CONTROVERSY

289

enemies to the judgement of the law is one of the most significant
tributes that Power has ever paid to reason….”231
It is therefore the obligation of African states parties to the Rome
Statute to cooperate with the ICC in a concerted effort at building a better
institution that will deliver justice to states and victims that have been at the
receiving end of violence perpetrated with impunity by some African leaders.
IV.

POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF AN ICJ DECISION ON THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE

A.

Effects on the ICC Complementarity Jurisdiction

The future of international criminal justice lies in the efficient and
effective implementation of the complementarity principle by the national
courts. Article 17 of the Rome Statue provides that substantive rules that make
up the complementary regime and also qualifies the relationship between the
ICC and national jurisdictions.232 The Statute grants states the authority to
conduct their own trials with regards to the core crimes that are stipulated
under the Statute with the aid of financial, technical, and professional support
from the international community.233
In light of a future ICJ decision, it is submitted that this principle of
complementarity of ICC would be firmly established, that the ICC is only a
complementary institution and should serve as such. If the African Union in
the future moves on to establish the African Criminal Court with jurisdiction
over international criminal acts or if the national courts become more
empowered to settle these issues on their own, the ICC would face a lesser
task of the Office of the Prosecutor having to go out “fishing” for targets and
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cases as it has currently been accused of doing.234 These various regional
groups, as well as states, would also have the capacity to try these crimes
themselves and on their own territories which has been described as very
crucial to enhancing the judicial process and beneficial to victims as well.235
There may, therefore, come a time when the ICC would become an institution
that deals with these crimes only when the State is unable to and not unwilling
to try the crimes. Also, the ICC could serve as an institution that offers
technical, professional and financial support for States that require these in the
performance of their duties as well as further strengthening the legal systems
of states party to the Rome Statute. In effect States’ sovereignty would be
preserved while impunity is curbed to its minimum.236
B.

Effects on the Question of State Immunity and Immunity of State
Officials

A fundamental principle of the Rome Statute is that all defendants are
equal before it.237 This provision of the Statute codifies the rule of customary
international law, that whatever immunities an official might otherwise
possess under international law cannot be implored as a restriction or a form
of protection from criminal responsibility, ratione materiae.238 The Rome
Statute, which also deals with “Irrelevance of Official Capacity,” provides
that:
This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official
capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a
government official shall in no case exempt a person from
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criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of
itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.239
In recent times the meaning of this article has been under serious
contention. Individuals who have been affected by this article have protested
its application to their cases and have often applied Article 98 as their defense.
Article 98 provides that:
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or
assistance which would require the requested State to act
inconsistently with its obligations under international law with
respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or
property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the
cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.240
The application of Article 98 has led many parties’ signatories to the
Rome Statute to declare their inability and unwillingness to give up or arrest
individuals who may possess immunity under international law to the ICC
without the agreement of their own nation state. The most recent is Jordan
who refused to arrest Al-Bashir and defended itself by pleading “fundamental
rules and principles of international law.”241 Also, in the past, the lawyers in
the George W. Bush administration depended on Article 98 to negotiate
Bilateral Immunity Agreements (“BIAs”) with other countries in order to
avert any future surrender of any U.S. citizen to the Court.242 It has therefore
been posited that the forthcoming AO from the ICJ would seek to clarify the
relationship between Articles 27 and 98 in order to set to rest the issue of the
immunity of state officials243
However, there is extensive literature that supports the argument that
states and state officials, should not be granted immunity for the most serious
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crimes of an international nature.244 As stated earlier, the current controversy
is viewed by many as an agenda that is more political than legal. From the
history of the application of international criminal law, which dates back to
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals of 1945 until now, there is a clear
principle of the removal of all manner of immunities from any person who
commits the core crimes which are jus cogens before any international
criminal court.245 This is proven from the work done by the International Law
Commission and the establishment of ad hoc tribunals such as the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), as well as the Tokyo
and Nuremberg tribunals.246 The late Professor Cherif Bassiouni (former
consultant to the U.S. Departments of State and Justice) also supported this
principle of removal of immunities from state officials when he stated in his
book written after the Nuremberg Trials that “a new rule of customary
international law was established, namely that international immunities do not
apply to international prosecutions for certain international crimes.”247 It is
therefore clear that the ICJ AO may not necessary stray from what has been
developed in past and would give its ruling based on these guiding principles.
The ICC must, at all costs, resist the political pressure that has been
exerted upon it from various quarters. Instead, it should adhere to “what the
law is”248 true to the standards of treaty interpretation under Article 21 of the
Rome Statute as well as the Vienna Convention On the Law of Treaties.249
It is true that the text Article 98(1), when interpreted in conjunction with
Article 27, causes some form of ambiguity. However, as Article 27 is seen as
codifying a rule of customary international law, which seeks to deny
individuals the opportunity to rely on immunities that are attached to their
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positions as leaders in Government with regards to core crimes, the
interpretation of Article 98 must take this into account.250
The fact remains that people are not immune from prosecution before
an international court for core crimes that are under the jurisdiction of the
Rome Statute. Therefore, in the event that an individual who hails from a ICC
state stands accused, they must obviously be rendered to the Court as a result
of Article 27(2) and customary international law.251 For individuals that hail
from states that are not party to the Rome Statute, it is the duty of the UNSC
to temporally remove the immunity of such individuals and allow them to be
prosecuted before an international court. This power of the UNSC is vested
upon customary international law and was the foundation of the ICTY and the
ICTR’s authority and from records, these ad hoc tribunals pursued high
ranking leaders of governments, which included heads of states.252 Thus
through its referral system, the UNSC is reinforcing customary international
law as stipulated in Article 27 that official position is irrelevant to an
individual being charged before an international court.253 The question of
immunity of state officials may be described as the most important question
facing international criminal law today. To this end, it is the hope of civil
society groups and citizens of many countries that the forthcoming ruling of
the ICJ will further enforce the ICC’s position, as well as that of the
International Law Commission—that immunity does not apply to any state
official who is accused of international crimes, such as genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes.254
C.

Potential Uncertainties in the International Criminal Justice System

There have, however, been certain views that the forthcoming AO
would pose uncertainties in the international criminal justice system. Even
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though the African Union has raised various issues that are legally correct and
call for further legal deliberation and clarification, the ICJ generally agrees
with the African Union only on some issues—but it may eventually lean
towards the position of the ICC in its final decision.255 According to the
international legal expert, Professor Akande, such a move could create
conflicts for future jurisprudence.256 In the light of this, questions have been
asked as to what actions states should take in future situations where a
cooperation request conflicts with the requested state’s obligation under
customary or conventional international law to grant immunity. States
sometimes use different interpretations of various treaties to fit their own
purposes for opportunistic or diplomatic reasons.257 In the Arrest Warrant
Case of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), the ICJ
assessed immunity from prosecution for an acting minister of foreign affairs,
finding that absolute immunity for heads of state from criminal prosecution in
a domestic court exists under customary international law.258 However, such
immunities may not bar criminal prosecution in all cases, such as before an
international court with jurisdiction, including the ICC.259
When a state has agreed to the obligations of an international treaty that
waives immunity, such as the Rome Statute, this may fall within the exception
pointed out by the ICJ. However, there is still room for confusion based on
the treaty provisions.260 In relation to the ICC and its indictment of Al-Bashir,
Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute. Some scholars argue that the UNSC
resolution rendered Sudan akin to a State Party; hence, Sudan should be seen
as bound by the Rome Statute.261 This line of reasoning is mainly based on the
fact that UN member states, and therefore also Sudan, are required to carry
out Chapter VII measures by virtue of Article 25 of the UN Charter.262 This is
further supported by the assertion that Article 103 of the UN Charter
determines that, in the event of a conflict, obligations under the UN Charter
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are paramount over all obligations “under any other international
agreements.”263 However it can be argued that, while the UNSC has the power
and right under the UN Charter to impose treaty obligations on nonstate
parties when acting under Chapter VII,264 rendering Sudan a state party via
the UNSC referral resolution and hence applying Article 27 of the Rome
Statute to Sudan in ICC proceedings, could be problematic under international
law. The general principle of international law of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec
prosunt stipulates that “[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights
for a third State without its consent,” which is enshrined in Article 34 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties.265 This position266 regarding
Sudan as a non-state having to comply with state obligations arising from the
Rome Statute after a Chapter VII UNSC referral has been decided in the
negative by the ICC in Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan. There, the Court found
that “the conclusion that Resolution 1593 altered Sudan’s legal position is
inescapable—and . . . this is consistent with the basic structure of international
law because Sudan consented to the UN Security Council exercising such a
power.”267
In the context of immunity and the prosecution of international crimes,
and more specifically, in respect of national proceedings, the Al-Bashir case
brings to the fore the question of hierarchy between sources of international
law. More precisely, whether or not there is a hierarchy between international
treaty provisions and customary international law rules, and if not, what are
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the applicable conflict resolution principles?268 This constitutes a norm
conflict in the strict sense since a state that is bound by these two rules “cannot
simultaneously comply with its obligations.”269
The current impasses between the African Union and the ICC have
brought to the fore the various challenges with the interpretation of these
treaties. This is however for the greater good because this enhanced dialogue
would serve as support to the development of the jurisprudence of
international criminal law.
D.

Potential “Supremacy” Battle Between the ICC and ICJ

Another issue that has been raised by some legal scholars is that this
move by the African Union would lead to a potential battle of supremacy
between the ICC and the ICJ.270 This has been foreseen as happening should
the ICJ make an attempt of circumventing the ICC’s jurisdiction on this matter
by offering a deferring opinion.271 This could lead to a potential conflict in
approaches between the two courts which is similar to the ICTY’s rejection in
the Tadić case of the ICJ’s test for effective control as formulated in the
Nicaragua case.272
Also, the potential interaction between the ICJ and the ICC could turn
out to be complex. This is true because, despite the fact that both courts are
supranational in nature, they operate in different spheres when it comes to the
areas of jurisdiction and subject matter.273 The ICJ is a court that adjudicates
disputes between states. Meanwhile, the ICC is a penultimate criminal court
that establishes foremost individual criminal responsibility and then (indirect)
state liability arising from potential non-compliance with duties arising from
the Statute.274 To date there has been little or no interactions between these
two Courts and none were envisioned till now. To some scholars, the question
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that would be put to the ICJ for clarification deals directly with legal issues
that the ICC already adjudicates on. What remains for the international legal
community to see is whether the ICJ would in effect function as an appellate
court for the ICC and whether this would augur well for the international
criminal justice system.275 Whether this would be feasible and what its future
impact would be, will unfold as the case makes progress.
E.

International Criminal Justice in the aftermath of An ICJ Advisory
Opinion

The adoption of the Rome Statute marked an uneasy compromise in
international law and practice.276 After two decades of prosecuting crimes of
international nature, many have questioned the Court’s impact and whether
international criminal justice has improved.277 It has been posited that the ICC
is currently going through crisis, and the Court needs overhauling in order to
regain its “glory” and credibility in the eyes of the international community
as the apex criminal court dealing efficiently and effectively with various
international crimes.278 The move taken by the African Union has therefore
been described as a chance for the ICC to utilize the ICJ’s AO as an
opportunity to review its format of operation in order to dispel allegations of
bias and racism.279
Also, many have regarded the upcoming opinion of the ICJ as a course
of action that would serve to improve the development of international
criminal justice. This is because the legal questions that form the current basis
of the discord between the African Union and the ICC are multifaceted and
advance significant issues related to justice and international accountability in
general. It is without doubt that the clarification that this AO would bring to
the issue of immunity of heads of states under the Rome Statute and customary
international law would have wider implications on international law as well
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as international institutions beyond the scope of the legal question which is
currently under dispute.280
For international criminal justice to develop from the level where it
currently operates in light of such an ICJ decision, it would be prudent for all
members of the United Nations to embrace the work of the ICC. The support
for the ICC is currently low with the majority of world powers going to great
lengths to disassociate themselves from the Court. This has further discredited
the Court in several ways and hindered its progress as well. Efforts should be
made to ensure that the ICC is well structured in its deliberations thereby
making it relevant in the development of international criminal justice.
V.

SOME RECOMMENDATIONS

The impasse that has developed between the African Union and the ICC
over the past decade and its global effects continue to bring to the fore the
challenges that the ICC encounters within the African legal context as well as
the political and institutional landscape. The current political environment in
Africa can be described as unfavorable to the development of law and justice
on the continent. The complementarity principle of the ICC has failed to work
on the African continent due to the opposition of some political leaders who
are often, directly or indirectly, complicit in the commission of crimes under
the Statute. The immunity principle proffered by the African Union has helped
in shielding some of the masterminds of such crimes. The entrenched stance
taken by both parties has not helped in resolving the matter and has in turn
tarnished the image of the ICC. This could lead to its collapse if nothing is
done and the African Union follows through with its plans of setting up its
own criminal court and decides to withdraw from the ICC. It is therefore
evident that certain measures need to be enforced to rebuild the confidence in
the ICC as well as meet the expectations of peace and justice with special
emphasis on Africa. The request for an AO from the ICJ was a step in the right
direction, notwithstanding the outcome. In addition, the following measures,
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if implemented, could reasonably aid in ensuring that the international justice
system is improved.
A.

Enhancing the capacity of member states to prosecute ICC crimes

We recommend that the various institutions that deal with legal issues
at the member state level in the African Union should be empowered to
prosecute the crimes of the Rome Statute domestically, the standard in Europe
and the United States. Such empowerment does require the availability of the
necessary resources. The various actors—institutions, human resource etc.—
should be equipped with the necessary, infrastructure, skills development, and
support to carry out the appropriate legal activities to ensure that such crimes
are investigated and prosecuted efficiently and effectively. In addition to such
resourcing, there is the need for a wider approach that promotes the role of the
main institutional implementing and enforcing bodies. Such an approach calls
for a total reform in the judicial services of many nation states. The judiciary
should also be supported to be independent of the executive and the legislative
arms of government. It is also recommended that the necessary legal training
and retraining of judges, court officials, police, prison officers, and special
prosecutors should be carried out frequently to empower them perform their
duties of prosecuting such crimes as well as guarding the rights of citizens.
The special prosecutors and judges must ensure that they are continuously
abreast with the rules and regulations of the International Criminal Law and
are putting them into practice in their work. Governments should also ensure
that the necessary support in terms of resources are put in place for all offices
of special prosecutors and attorney general departments to enable them to
prosecute these crimes of international nature.
B.

Suspension of the Establishment of a Regional Criminal Court in
Africa

We also recommend that the African Union suspend its efforts to
establish a regional criminal court or a criminal arm of the current African
Court in the interim. In the objectives stated in its withdrawal strategy listed
in the previous section, the establishment of an African criminal court is
imbedded in sections (iii) and (iv) and the challenge of a possibility of
selectivity, unfairness and double standards can definitely not be ruled out.
This possibility is highlighted by the fact that the Amended Protocol provides
immunity for heads of governments and their officials while they are in power
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(which would be for very long periods because as it is familiar with Africa,
there is a culture of leaders staying in power for very long periods). Under
customary international law, personal immunity may only be raised before
national courts of foreign states in relation to an indictment for international
crimes. However, the African Union in the Amendment Protocol has extended
this power to an international court which is contrary to established customary
international law. As a result, several scholars have rightly viewed this
provision as “a major setback in the advancement of international criminal
justice,” which can only be construed as in tangent with the interests of those
African leaders who are fearful of facing the law due to a culture of impunity
they have created during their leadership.281 What the African Union has done
speaks to the same challenge that it currently has with the UNSC, namely
serving the interests of others to the detriment of ensuring justice.282 What the
African Union should pursue is to empower its nation states to be able to
prosecute such crimes in their own jurisdiction without unnecessary
manipulation of the judicial systems.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The issue of immunity for heads of states and other government
officials has been an ongoing tussle between the African Union and the ICC
for over a decade. Over the years the two parties have remained entrenched in
their positions with the African Union finally calling on its members not to
cooperate with the ICC and threatening to withdraw from the ICC. This has
resulted in a loss for both parties because the African Union has focused its
attention over the years in fighting the ICC by resisting its efforts in Africa
while abandoning its mission to ensure that victims of these crimes receive
the necessary justice and perpetrators are not shielded from facing the law and
that peace and the rule of law are upheld on the African continent. The ICC,
on the other hand, has faced various challenges in performing its duties due to
the lack of cooperation from the countries and also its inability to properly
clarify the law during its deliberations. There has been bad blood between the
two organizations for a long period and the African Union has finally decided
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to request for an AO from the ICJ on this contentious issue which has been
considered a right step towards the development of international criminal
justice.
Therefore, there is a general feeling that the ICJ, which is not bound by
the Rome Statute and which is regarded as the foremost international tribunal
on matters related to general international law, is the answer to making
progress on this contentious issue.283
This article has sought to discuss what led to this impasse between the
two parties, it has also assessed the likely nature of the relationship that would
exist between the two parties in light of the upcoming ruling and its
implication on the future of international criminal justice.
The central argument that permeates the article is that regardless of the
outcome of an AO from the ICJ, the African Union and the ICC should forge
a new consensus to build a better framework for the ICC to operate in. Adding
to that, it is clear that the future of international criminal justice is imbedded
in states becoming better equipped to adjudicate such crimes and to seek for
help of the ICC when it becomes impossible to handle such matters. This
would ensure that the complementarity principle of the Rome Statute is fully
adhered to. Even though most African states currently lack the capacity to
implement the provisions of the Rome Statute due to the “absence of effective
legislative framework for implementation, limited expertise on the part of
investigators, prosecutors, and judges, [and] the national judicial systems lack
of resources as well as corruption[,] which has permeated all sectors of the
economy,”284 it is the hope that moving forward regional bodies like the
African Union will promote international criminal justice by allowing reason
to prevail over politics, joining hands with the rest of the international
community to ensure that the rule of law is maintained. A compromise must
be sought and found.
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